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
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Ulysses S. Grant: Father of the Operational Art of Warfare

by

David R. O'Brien

Cdr. US Navy



A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in Partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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In 1982, the United States Army formally introduced the concept of the "operational level of war" into its basic manual on doctrine, Field Manual 100-5. Over 120 years earlier, General Ulysses Simpson Grant was planning and executing campaign strategies, first to open the Mississippi River, then in the race to destroy the Army of Virginia and bring about the defeat of the Confederacy. Grant was the first, and may have been the best, military mind ever to comprehend the importance of combining all elements of national power against an enemy's ability to fight. Today's operational commander must understand that for a victory on the battlefield to count, it must play a part in satisfying strategic goals set down by national authority. Anything less, is a waste of time, and lives.

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PREFACE

In writing this paper, I do not pretend to be a Civil War Historian. Nor do I intend to prove the validity of the operational art of warfare. What I hope to convey is the supreme importance Grant placed on marrying up a campaign plan of action with the strategic goals it was to accomplish. The crux of this paper is how the final goal drove every action he took, from the initial planning of a campaign to its final execution. In so doing, I have concentrated my efforts on those actions that preceded the actual fighting and discussion of the impact the final outcome had on Grant's future planning. Subsequently, the nuts and bolts of the tactical level of warfare, the actual battle, were left out.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| CHAPTER | PAGE |
|---|------|
| ABSTRACT | ii |
| PREFACE | iii |
| I. INTRODUCTION..... | 1 |
| II. OPERATIONAL ART OF WAR DEFINED | 2 |
| III. BACKGROUND OF ULYSSES S. GRANT | 6 |
| IV. THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER CAMPAIGN | 11 |
| V. THE FINAL CAMPAIGN | 18 |
| VI. CONCLUSION | 21 |
| BIBLIOGRAPHY | 23 |
| NOTES | 25 |

ULYSSES S. GRANT: FATHER OF THE OPERATIONAL ART OF WARFARE

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

"The identification of the enemy's Center of Gravity and the single minded focus on the sequence of actions necessary to expose and destroy it, are the essence of the operational art of warfare."¹

During the Civil War, only one man invoked this single minded focus; General Ulysses Simpson Grant. Volume upon volume of printed material point to the massive industrial and manpower capacity of the North as the only reason the "superior" generalship of the Confederacy was defeated. True, once it was developed, the North had a decided advantage in firepower and sheer force. But it was the abilities of a lone northern General who was finally able to marry this firepower and great industrial potential to a plan of warfare that encompassed not only battlefield engagements, but the fulfillment of the strategic goals of a nation. In so doing, Ulysses S. Grant ushered the armed forces of the United States into a new level of warfare; the operational level.

CHAPTER II

OPERATIONAL ART OF WARFARE DEFINED

The first thing we must understand, is what exactly is meant by "the operational art of warfare? As defined in Headquarters Department of the Army, FM 100-5, the operational art of war is "the use of available military forces to attain strategic goals within a theater of war."² Strategic goals are formulated by leaders at the National level, but the nation's military leaders must have a clear sense of strategic policy goals and objectives, how the use of military force fits into the overall national security strategy, and the desired military end state.³ It is the job of the operational level commander to translate the national strategy into tactical success.

In order to accomplish his assigned strategic goals, the operational commander must think on the theater level of warfare. At his disposal, are the four (4) elements of power: political, economic, psychological, and military. It is through the utilization of these 4 elements of power that the commander must attack the enemy's Center of Gravity, and protect his own.

"Key and overwhelming responsibility of the operational level commander is to remain focused on the strategic objective and on the center of gravity. If he becomes focused on tactical activities of command, and loses perspective, he may win the battles but fail to execute mission."⁴

It could be argued that this was the key to Lee's defeat, and Grant's success. Grant, throughout the Civil War, always focused his attention on the sequence of actions necessary to expose and

destroy the South's center of gravity, its ability to wage war through its resources and its army, while protecting his own, the North's will to fight and continue the war. In so doing, he understood the importance of the center of gravity, while displaying the essence of operational art:

"It is against the center of gravity that our energies should be directed. If the enemy is thrown off balance, he must not be given time to recover. Blow after blow must be aimed in the same direction: the victor, in other words, must strike with all his strength and not just against a fraction of the enemy's. Not by taking things the easy way, but by constantly seeking out the center of his power, by daring all to win all, will one really defeat the enemy."⁵

After the initial battle, and horrendous casualties, of the Wilderness campaign in 1864, Grant's troops were amazed that instead of heading north, back to safety, Grant turned south, to hit Lee again, and again, and again.

The operational commander carries out his plan to accomplish the strategic objective, through a series of campaigns. Simply stated, a campaign is, "...a series of related military actions undertaken over a period of time to achieve a specific objective within a given region."⁶ The campaign plan must (1) highlight the strategic aim, (2) describe the end state which will guarantee that aim, (3) give the overall concept and intent of the campaign, (4) plan a tentative sequence of phases and operational objectives which will lead to success, and (5) provide general concepts for key supporting functions, especially a logistical concept.⁷ As I will point out in Grant's planning for both the Mississippi and Wilderness campaigns, he was a master.

Up to this time, warfare was looked upon in the United States, and for that matter, throughout the world, as a series of battles or engagements that destroyed your enemy's army and provided you with victory. Before the War Between the States, this country's most recent war with Mexico in 1846 was just such a war. In this war, the strategic goal of the Polk administration was for the U.S. Army to march to Mexico City while he tried influencing the Mexican legislature through the bribery of Santa Anna. The battle, and defeat of Mexico's army, was the only goal. The victory over the Mexican Army in a series of minor skirmishes, and its subsequent capitulation, would set the tone for an anticipated quick, and decisive resolution of the Civil War 12 years later.

The war with Mexico provided valuable war fighting experience for junior officers named, Lee, Grant, Meade, J.E. Johnston, A.S. Johnston, Holmes, Hebert and others.⁸ It provided Quartermaster, Second Lieutenant U.S. Grant with a respect for all facets of warfare, but most importantly, the value logistics plays in an army's fighting and welfare.

"Quartermastering in the Mexican war taught Grant that strategy and operational art were useless unless you can provision men with arms, ammunition, food and clothing."⁹

Additionally, it brought Grant face to face with a future adversary, Robert E. Lee the legend, and pointed out his mortality to Grant.

"The natural disposition of most people is to clothe a commander of a large army whom they do not know, with almost superhuman abilities. A large part of the National Army, for instance, and most of the press of the

country, clothed General Lee with just such qualities, but I had known him previously, and knew that he was mortal; and it was just as well that I felt this."¹⁰

Grant would remember this well when he planned and executed the Wilderness Campaign of 1864.

CHAPTER III

BACKGROUND OF ULYSSES S. GRANT

I need to digress here, to study Ulysses S. Grant the man, and piece together those influences and personality traits that would shape his thinking in later life. It's important because, far from the leader who excels at every endeavor, Grant was a man who excelled at but one thing; soldiering.

He was born in Ohio on April 27, 1822. His early adolescence was without incident although his relationship with his parents would come to affect his entire life. His father, Jesse Grant, owned a tannery where his son detested working. He was a strict disciplinarian who closely controlled all decisions affecting Grant's life. Grant's need to please and be looked upon as a success by his father so infiltrated his psyche that even when he was commanding the nation's largest army, in its bloodiest war, Grant routinely would write his father discussing his military decisions seeking his approval. This quest for acceptance from his father would serve to fuel his desire for success as a general throughout the Civil War. His relationship with his mother was even worse. They were never close and she rarely showed affection towards him. Later in life, when Grant would send his wife, Julia, to live with his parents while he was in California, she was barely able to withstand the criticism continuously leveled at Grant by his parents.

Grant received an appointment to West Point in the summer of 1839 only through the perseverance of his father. He was by no

means excited about pursuing a career in the military, but did so because it was his father's wish, and a way to get escape the tannery. At the academy with Grant were upperclassmen such as Bill Sherman, William Rosecrans, John Pope, and Pete Longstreet. In his first year, Grant failed to distinguish himself as the scholar and finished 27 out of 60. In actuality, because of his introverted personality and small stature, he was largely ignored by his fellow classmates. The only distinguishing characteristic, either physically or personally, that he displayed during this time was his superior abilities as a horseman. It was partly due to this ability that propelled him to the esteemed position of cadet sergeant for his junior year, a position of leadership Grant himself felt he was unprepared and ill-suited. He was demoted back to the rank of private for his senior year and graduated from the academy in June 1843, 21st out of a class of 39.

The early days of Grant's military career, like most of his days at West Point, were markedly uneventful. A litany of unimpressive duty stations, Jefferson Barracks, Missouri, New Orleans, Detroit, New York, back to Detroit, and finally California, were interrupted only by the previously mentioned duty in Mexico. The crowning and all important event from his commissioning date of June, 1843, until he resigned from the Army in July of 1854, was his marriage to Julia Dent.

Grant's endearing love for his wife, their inability to live together in many of his duty stations due to high costs and low military wages, and his distinct inability to prove himself even an

"adequate" soldier, were the primary reasons for his resignation. His inadequacy as a soldier was rumored to stem from a drinking problem. Much has been written about Grant's "penchant" for liquor. True, he, along with his fellow officers, did drink regularly to combat the extreme loneliness experienced in California. But his insobriety resulted more from an inability to physically handle liquor than from massive overindulgence. Still, this one facet of his personality, more than any other, would haunt him throughout his career and be raised on more than one occasion, mostly by jealous contemporaries, as reason (excuse) to relieve of command. It would be the influence of his wife Julia, and his assistant adjutant general, John Rawlins, who would guide him away from his dependency on alcohol during the Civil War.

"Rawlins aroused Grant's sensibilities and gave his actions prompt, aggressive, and unrelenting character. While worshipping the ground Grant walked, he was fiercely protective of the General.""

Leaving the Army in July, 1854, he headed home to his family, and poverty. In his father's eyes, he had left the service in disgrace due to his drinking problem. Worse yet, his "sickness" was well known among the local population. To compound the problem, Grant had absolutely no head for business and allowed himself to be taken advantage of in virtually every business opportunity he embarked. He had to borrow money regularly and was unable to hold a steady job. On numerous occasions, both his father, and father-in-law, lent him resources in an attempt to get him started, only to have Grant return needing more. The one thing Grant did excel at was military history. In 1858, friends

recollected Grant's mood as morbid and he as,

"...a man thinking on an abstract subject all the time. The only time he seemed to rally was when someone wanted to talk with him about a war. They remembered him sitting at his desk, poring over newspaper accounts of the French and Italian wars. Grant liked to be asked for a military opinion, and would discuss battles real or imaginary with a precision and flair his listeners enjoyed."¹²

In later life, after the war, John Russell Young, a friend and correspondent, tells of Grant,

"... walking up and down the deck...describing all of Napoleon's campaigns, from Morengo down to Leipsic, speaking of each battle in the most minute manner. Then back to the battles of Frederick the Great; Leuthen, the campaigns of the Thirty Years War; back to the campaigns of Caesar, and always illustrating as he talked, the progress and change in the art of war, and how machinery, projectiles, and improvements in arms had made what would be a great victory for Napoleon, almost impossible now."¹³

On this subject, however, Grant himself cautioned of applying too much credence on the tactics surrounding separate battles,

"Some of our Generals...failed because they worked out everything by rule. They knew what Frederick did at one place, and Napoleon at another. They were always thinking about what Napoleon would do. I don't underrate the value of military history, but if men make war in slavish observances to rules, they will fail...While our Generals are working out problems of an ideal character, problems that would have looked well on a blackboard, practical facts were neglected. War is progressive. I do not believe in luck in war any more than luck in business. Luck is a small matter, may affect a battle or a movement, but not a campaign or a career."¹⁴

Grant talked the science side of warfare, but walked the art side. He used his individual experiences on the battlefield, and those of history, to build upon a foundation for planning future campaigns. But, unlike the vast majority of military men of his time, he never allowed the theory or science of war to replace the practicality of

what numerous Generals, both allied and enemy, commented as his overriding strong point; good old common sense. Carl Von Clausewitz agreed when he said,

"... principles and rules are intended to provide a thinking man with a frame of reference for the movements he has been trained to carry out, rather than to serve as a guide which at the moment of action lays down precisely the path he must take."¹⁵

A simplistic, common sense approach to solving problems became Grant's trademark. And although he was a nondescript personality throughout much of his life, his ability to rise above the occasion in times of chaos and futility always amazed those around him.

"When everything was right and normal, he shrank...into mediocrity; when all was in chaos, he sought to restore normalcy."¹⁶

"He was at his best, when things were at their worst."¹⁷

What so often happens in history, particularly military history, when common, unassuming men are called from the sidelines to perform uncommon tasks, was about to begin in the United States in 1860. Penniless, working as a clerk for his brother's leather business, Ulysses S. Grant's moment had finally arrived.

CHAPTER IV

THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER CAMPAIGN

The War Between the States was one between the agricultural South, and the new, industrial North. It was a war that divided families, ideologies, and a nation. It was a war that both sides felt they could win through quick, decisive battles. Winfield Scot, head of the Union military effort, was one of a handful of leaders who felt strongly that this it would be protracted.

While in charge of the Galena, Illinois, recruitment committee, Grant met an influential politician who was immediately impressed with Grant's intellect and down to earth style. This acquaintance ultimately led to the Governor of Illinois appointing Grant commander of the 21st Regiment of Illinois volunteers. Again, his small stature, ragged appearance, and quiet manner failed to impress either his men or his superiors. But it was soon apparent that his ability to lead and fight would.

Initially, Grant was sent to Missouri to seek out pro-unionist sentiment. Here, Grant began to see the importance of the 4 elements of power in accomplishing Lincoln's national strategy. In Missouri, it was balancing the political feelings of secessionists and unionists. Next, in Cairo, Il, it would be dealing with southern sympathies, martial law, imperfect censorship, and runaway slaves, all while planning a military campaign down the Mississippi River. It was this ability to understand and incorporate the separate elements into every campaign he planned that would endear him to Lincoln as his most trusted and able General.

Another valuable lesson learned while in Missouri was one of human nature. After being sent out to cross a ridge and engage a suspected enclave of Confederate forces, Grant, overcoming great fear of his first engagement, found the confederates had retreated out of fear. Grant learned that

"...he who fears the least holds the initiative, and that he who can make his adversary fear more than he does himself, has already defeated him morally."¹⁸

Lincoln's strategic goal for the unification of the North and South could only be accomplished through the complete defeat of the forces of the Confederacy. On the other hand, to maintain itself, the South realized it must resist any attempts of invasion of its territories by the North, and hope for (1) assistance from Europe to their cause, and (2) quick, costly (to the North) victories that would wear down the North's will to fight. The Confederacy spread from the Potomac River in the North, southwest past the Mississippi River into Arkansas, south to New Orleans, east to the Atlantic coast, and back north to the Potomac. Roughly, 450,000 square miles. Lincoln felt the fall of Richmond would mean the fall of the Confederacy. Grant, however, felt that to defeat the South you must take control of the Mississippi and squeeze from the west while applying pressure from the North and East. Only by doing this would the south's ability to wage war, be defeated. Grant, early on, was looking at the operational level of war from the theater perspective, as opposed to the battlefield perspective.

Grant's early successes, Forts Henry and Donelson, led to the cutting of the strategic railway link between Nashville and

Memphis. But more importantly, the fall of Fort Henry was the North's first unqualified battlefield success and instantly made a hero of, now General, Ulysses S. Grant.

From Donelson, Grant proposed to cut the railroad connection at Corinth, Mississippi, and began assembling his troops at Pittsburg Landing, near Shiloh, Tennessee. Here, Grant would make a mistake that would not only affect his thinking in conducting all future campaigns, but would affect the way his superiors, and country, would view him in the years to come. While waiting for reinforcements from Buell to arrive before beginning the assault on Corinth, Grant failed to place himself in the shoes of Johnston, the Confederate commander. So sure was Grant that confederate troops would sit and wait behind their defensive fortifications, he made no effort to fortify his own. This, even after reports reached him of increasing confederate activity in the woods around Pittsburg Landing. The result was complete surprise on the part of the Confederate troops when they attacked in the early dawn of 6 April, 1862. The North suffered heavy losses both to their troops and trust in Grant's ability. Grant was relieved of direct command.

Over time, out of necessity for action, Grant was reinstated as Commander of the entire Mississippi. This was important to begin planning for one of the first, and most successful, operational warfare campaigns ever conceived; the campaign against Vicksburg. As already stated, Grant's strategy was to take the Mississippi thereby cutting off the South from its western states.

In order to do this, the heavily fortified river town of Vicksburg would need to be taken.

As previously discussed, in planning campaigns, certain questions must be answered.¹⁹ First, what military condition must be produced in the theater of war or operations to achieve the strategic goal? Grant realized the strategic, and political, significance of Vicksburg. All along, Grant felt that control of the Mississippi River was critical to begin constricting the South and her resources. Even later, when planning his campaign of 1864, Grant would continue what he started in Vicksburg by sending Sherman and Banks eastward from Tennessee and New Orleans. Politically, anti-war sentiment was growing in the North after more losses and heavy casualties in the East, and by gains made by the Democrats in the elections of 1862. Lincoln and the North drastically needed a strategic victory to show that they could reunify the Union. When his canal digging efforts at bypassing the Vicksburg fortifications on the Mississippi were unsuccessful, Grant realized the prudent thing to do would be to move his forces North and regroup for an overland assault.²⁰ But he also realized the delay would be unacceptable and would only serve to strengthen the anti-war sentiment.

The second question that needed to be answered was, what sequence of events is most likely to produce that condition? Grant was fully aware, after Sherman's aborted assault on Vicksburg in December 1862, that a frontal assault from the river, or the North, was useless. Rear Admiral Porter's guns couldn't elevate high

enough to make an impact on the high ground surrounding Vicksburg, and the terrain to the North was perfect for Pemberton, the Confederate general, to defend. And, because of the fortifications on the river, moving gunboats past them to the south to ferry troops across was almost impossible. Therefore, Pemberton fully expected Grant to attempt another attack from the North once he (Grant) received reinforcements. This is exactly what Grant hoped Pemberton would think. With this in mind, Grant decided he must attack from the east, cut off the Confederates from their lines of communication in Jackson, and besiege the city to force its capitulation. If he could accomplish this, the North not only would control the Mississippi, but they would lay open western access to the Confederacy itself.

Next, Grant set about applying the resources to accomplish the assault. First, Grant developed a close, working relationship with Rear Admiral Porter. Although neither was in the other's chain of command, Porter and Grant realized that only through close cooperation could they succeed. Porter's gunboats would run the Vicksburg river defenses at night, while Grant's troops would march south, along the western side of the Mississippi, and meet up at Hard Times. From there, Porter's boats would ferry Grant's troops across to Grand Gulf on the east side of the river. In order to keep Pemberton from reinforcing his troops at Grand Gulf, and to keep him believing the main assault would come from the north, Sherman's forces would conduct intricate feinting maneuvers against the northern defenses. Once Grant was on the east side of the

river, his troops would detach themselves from their own lines of supply, race across Mississippi to Jackson and cut off Pemberton from his reinforcements. This was the part of the plan that all of Grant's generals disagreed with and thought foolhardy. However, drawing on his experiences from the Mexican war when he was charged to provide his troops provisions from the local economy, Grant knew he could do the same in Mississippi. Once Jackson was destroyed, Grant planned to head west, join Sherman, and capture Vicksburg.

The last thing Grant had to consider, was what was the likely cost or risk to his forces in performing his plan? There were numerous risks associated with the plan. First, Grant wasn't sure Porter's gunboats could make it past the fortifications. Also, what if Pemberton didn't fall for the deception to the north and sent the bulk of his troops to the south to hit Grant's troops crossing the river? There was the risk that during the race to Jackson confederate troops would engage his flanks and stall his movements before he reached it. Grant took all of these risks into consideration, but had the confidence in his men, and his plan, to deem them acceptable. In the end, he was right. His campaign went almost without a flaw. After a months siege, Vicksburg fell on July 4, 1863. Coupled with Lee's defeat at Gettysburg, the North was now poised for its final assault. Lincoln, realizing there was only one man capable of commanding this last campaign, appointed Grant Lieutenant General and put him in command of all the Union Armies. In a letter to Grant after the Vicksburg campaign, Lincoln said,

"I express entire satisfaction with what you've done up to this time, and the particulars of your plans I neither know of, or seek to know. I wish not to obtrude any constraints or restraints upon you."²¹

Lincoln knew, as Grant proved at Vicksburg, that

"...there was a relation between society and war, that sometimes in war, generals had to act in response to popular or political considerations."²²

CHAPTER V

THE FINAL CAMPAIGN

After receiving the accolades of a grateful nation, Grant immediately began planning the final campaign of the war. As Grant perceived it, the entire economic and military force of the North must simultaneously, and ruthlessly, be brought against the South in a coordinated, multi-pronged attack on the Confederacy's resources to wage war. His initial strategy for the campaign concentrated on the West.²³ He still believed in the importance of the Mississippi River and wanted to advance an army to capture Mobile then advance in the South's rear area against Montgomery and Selma. However, realizing the political considerations Lincoln was faced with in Tennessee, and the South's growing influence there, Grant began formulating a campaign aimed at the heart of the Confederacy, Lee's Army of Northern Virginia. He would seek to encircle the Confederacy and slowly begin to constrict it, destroying its resources as they went. Sherman would attack Johnston from Chattanooga, relieve the pressure on Tennessee, continue through Atlanta all the way to Savannah on the coast. In issuing his orders Grant instructed Sherman to,

"...move against Johnston's army to break it up and to get into the interior of the enemy's country as far as you can, inflicting all the damage you can against their war resources."²⁴

In true operational style, Grant left the particular details of the plan to Sherman and his staff.

Next Grant instructed Major General Banks to go against

Mobile. By consolidating troops from remote southeastern and southwestern sections of the country, Grant wanted to begin bringing pressure against those areas where it mattered, towards their Center of Gravity.

Grant gave similar orders to Major General Siegel that he had to Sherman; destroy the enemies ability to wage war in the Shenendoah Valley. He ordered Major General Butler to "advance along the south side of the James River, all the while focusing on Richmond as the final objective."²⁵ Grant was thinking ahead to a possible linkup of Meade's and Butler's army in a siege of Richmond.²⁶

Finally, and most importantly, Grant directed Major General Meade to go after Lee. Grant's orders to Meade were simple, "Lee's army will be your objective point. Wherever Lee goes, there you will go also."²⁷

Without discussing the particulars of each engagement that made up the campaign of 1864-5, it can be ruled a success based on the sole fact that it achieved the strategic goal; the unconditional surrender of the South and the reunification of the Union. Along the way, especially in the East, the North suffered innumerable casualties, for which Grant was awarded the nickname, Grant, "The Butcher." The primary reason for these losses was not a flaw in Grant's leadership, but the result of the offensive position Grant was placed, continually fighting against a defensively entrenched Southern army. Clausewitz points out,

"No, not only reason, but hundreds and thousands of examples show that a well-prepared, well-manned, and

well-defended entrenchment must generally be considered as an impregnable point, and is indeed regarded by the attacker."²⁸

Grant realized that Lee enjoyed an immense advantage. But he also realized that while he endured the majority of the casualties, Lee was also sustaining them. And while the North was replenishing hers, the South's supplies were exhausted. Again, as Clausewitz points out,

"Only (attacks on defensive positions) that achieve these aims are appropriate: wearing the enemy forces down, whether totally or partially, or neutralizing them."²⁹

Grant, by attacking and repositioning to the south, attacking and repositioning, and so on, and so on, was wearing the south down...totally. At no other time in his entire career, was Grant's leadership questioned, and questioned again, as it was during this period. But Grant always kept the strategic goal, and the South center of gravity, in focus and, despite overwhelming casualties, marched towards it.

CONCLUSION

Ulysses S. Grant accepted victory as he did all things in life, graciously and without pomp and ceremony. In accepting Lee's surrender at Appomattox, Grant told Lee,

"I met you once before, General Lee, while we were serving in Mexico, when you came over from General Scott's headquarters to visit Garland's brigade, to which I then belonged. I have always remembered your appearance, and I think I should have recognized you anywhere."³⁰

Lee replied,

"Yes, I know I met you on that occasion, and I have often thought of it, and tried to recollect how you looked, but I have never been able to recall a single feature."³¹

Throughout his life Grant failed to impress with either his looks or his manner. Only on the field of battle, specifically, as the "Father" of the operational art of warfare, did people stand up and take notice. His ability to plan and execute "sequence of actions" to achieve the strategic goal was what endeared him to Lincoln. He thought on the operational level leaving his separate commanders to fight the battles. The lessons he taught would be relearned again during the First World War. Eventually, in World War II, they would reach fruition.

When Clausewitz described the will of the military genius and how it is affected by the enemy's resistance, he may as well have been describing Ulysses S. Grant.

"So long as the unit fights cheerfully, with spirit and élan, great strength of will is rarely needed; but once conditions become difficult, as they must when much is at stake, things no longer run like a well-oiled machine. The machine itself begins to resist, and the commander needs tremendous will-power to overcome this resistance.

The machine resistance need not consist of disobedience and argument, though this occurs often enough in individual soldiers. It is the impact of the ebbing of moral and physical strength, of the heart-rendering spectacle of the dead and wounded, that the commander has to withstand-first in himself, and then in all those who, directly or indirectly, have entrusted him with their thoughts and feelings, hopes and fears. As each man's strength gives out, as it no longer responds to his will, the inertia of the whole gradually comes to rest on the commander's will alone."³²

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